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Protective orders are commonplace in civil litigation, with
trade secrets, privileged communications, and the like protected from
public disclosure.
In most cases, the protective orders are
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individualized and discrete, with each document evaluated
separately.
In mass torts, protective orders are a different beast. When
litigants (mostly defendants) are producing large numbers of
documents, they typically agree to a blanket protective order in
advance, with the confidentiality of documents being designated by
the producing party without document-by-document evaluation by
the court. Such orders ordinarily permit the challenge of the
confidentiality designations, but those challenges are relatively rare.
In such cases, then, the confidentiality of the documents during the
discovery process is largely within the control of the producing
party. If the cases reach trial, very few if any documents used at trial
are kept within the protective order, as the presumption for public
access shifts to being very strong at that stage.
The parties agree to such orders for two primary reasons.
First, it is a practical way to deal with the sheer volume of exhibits
and the fact that many of the documents are legitimately secretmanufacturing techniques, for instance, in pharmaceutical cases.
Second, maintaining defendants' "bad documents" in secrecy
provides leverage for plaintiffs in negotiating settlements short of
trial, since settlement will theoretically prevent the documents from
becoming public. Similarly, leaked documents can be used to create
embarrassment and concomitant pressure on defendants (especially
those that are publicly traded) to settle cases or to generate media
attention that will recruit additional potential clients.
Many papers address the question of the appropriate use of
protective orders dealing with the issues described above. The
scholarship focuses on the proper balance for the tort system to strike
between its role as a means for resolving disputes and its potential
role as a means for obtaining information about the conduct of the
parties, especially as that conduct affects public health.'
This Article is not a fundamental challenge to the approach
discussed and suggested by those papers. Instead, I address that
scholarship initially to establish a foundational point: Most protective
orders in mass torts have been appropriate, and most documents
presently designated as confidential have been properly designated,
at least under the policies that have been established to date. Put
another way, I start with the notion that protective orders have value
1. See infra Part I.
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and that there are reasons to try to prevent their regular and notorious
violation. At the same time, I recognize that the orders have been
abused occasionally and perhaps even regularly. On that foundation,
I explore trends in protective order practice, focusing on the changes
effected by the rise of electronic communications, and addressing
two impacts in particular.
First, as set forth below, Internet and other new technologies
have dramatically increased the volume of documents to be produced
by parties in litigation, in turn increasing the costs and efforts
expended in the document designation process. Those increased
costs may result in a stronger probability of erroneous designation of
documents as confidential, whether intentionally erroneous or not.
A second, and likely more important, impact of electronic
communications is what happens when documents are disclosed
contrary to the protective order-intentionally or not. As recently as
a decade ago, parties and courts might have realistically hoped to
recover leaked confidential documents that were disclosed in
violation of a protective order without those documents becoming
generally available. Today, in any case that has attracted public
attention, the odds of such recovery are vanishingly small.
As the
2
unrung.
be
not
simply
can
bell
the
Article's title suggests,
These changes suggest that a reevaluation of protective
orders may be appropriate, and a change in courts' approaches to
protective order violations-whether in improper designation or
improper disclosure-may be appropriate as well. Because of the
reality changes outlined above, the balance struck may need to be
changed. Historically, violations of protective orders have been a
relatively low priority for the courts; the people involved receive
minor or no sanctions for their actions. Because the stakes are now
higher, I argue, the courts should be more open to serious
punishments for violations of protective orders (of any sort), and
should be more precise in laying out the orders in the first place. In
short, the courts should be much more focused on preventing leaks
before they occur, through deterrence and more precise protective

2.

Tom Zeller Jr., Documents Borne by Winds of Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES,

Jan. 15, 2007, at C3 (quoting William G. Childs, Judge Tries to Unring Bell
HangingAround Neck of Horse Already Out ofBarn Being Carriedon Ship That
Has Sailed, TORTSPROF BLOG, Dec. 20, 2006, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/

tortsprof/2006/12/j udge-triesjto.htm).

568

THE RE VIEW OFLITIGATION

[Vol. 27:4

orders, rather than remediation afterwards, which is almost entirely
pointless to even attempt.
I proceed in three Parts. In Part I, I briefly provide an
overview of the development of protective orders, particularly in
mass torts. In this Part, I describe the overall state of scholarship and
litigation relating to protective orders, in particular the balance
various writers have proposed between the parties' legitimate
privacy and confidentiality interests versus the public interest in
information-spreading. I also describe some leaks in past cases.
In Part II, I explore in some detail a recent case, the Zyprexa
litigation, that exemplifies most of the document disclosure issues
through a modem lens. This case, I argue, may suggest the future of
protective order violations, and should therefore be considered
carefully. 3 In that case, a paid plaintiffs' expert, a lawyer not
involved in the principal litigation, and a reporter from the New York
Times worked together in what a federal judge described as a
"conspiracy" to publicize documents previously under seal.4 In this
Part, I will describe the events in some detail, addressing the
potential overdesignation of documents by the defendant as well as
the process through which those documents became readily
available, even as the judge sought their return. As will become
clear, the use of anonymizing technologies-and the fundamental
ease of distributing documents electronically-made that effort
fruitless.
Finally, in Part III, I provide some suggestions for how
litigants and courts should change the way they act to deal with the
new world in which they are acting. To date, most protective orders
still look in the main as they did twenty or thirty years ago, and
efforts to enforce them are similarly static. Here, I suggest that
today's world mandates a shift in approach, and that business as
usual is no longer a reasonable option for a number of reasons. I
then urge greater penalties for violations of protective orders on any
side, including the possibility of holding attorneys directly
responsible in limited circumstances for the actions of their clients or
3. In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), is only
an example, and I note other recent protective order violations as well. That said,
the Zyprexa Injunction case is the best documented and best represents the
phenomena I am focusing on, and so it receives, by far, the most detailed
discussion.
4. Id. at 395.
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retained experts. I also suggest that protective orders should be more
readily subject to challenge by third parties. Finally, I argue that
protective orders should be more comprehensive and specific.

I.

HISTORY

What happens in court is presumptively public. 5 Once a
document or an excerpt of testimony is "used in the proceeding," 6 a
presumption of access attaches. A tremendous number of documents
and many hours of testimony are, however, never used in an action,
whether a mass tort or otherwise. As to those documents, the right
of access, if it exists at all, is much less clear. 7 And it is as to those
documents that the protective orders discussed in this Article apply.
Protective orders-particularly in mass torts-are designed to
facilitate the discovery and litigation process while protecting the
parties. 8 Federal courts have the authority to issue protective orders
under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Typically,
such orders are sought as to a particular document or set of
documents, or to the contents of a particular deposition.9 In mass
torts, however, it is common for parties to agree to prospective
protective orders, permitting the producing party to designate
documents as subject to the protective order without the court ruling
on them individually. 0
5.

E.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Secrecy in Civil Trials: Some Tentative Views, 9

J.L. & POL'Y 53, 53 (2000) ("The assumption that all aspects of court-centered
litigation are out in the open, on the record, and fully explained by the court is an
important foundation for the confidence our public has in its courts.").
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Rule 5(d), amended in 2001, directs courts to refuse
filing discovery materials until "used in the action." Once so filed, they are much
more likely to be deemed public. Without being filed, it is difficult for the public
to access them. See generally Weinstein, supra note 5, at 56-58 (describing the
common practice of secrecy agreements in case settlements).
7. 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD MARCUS,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2042, at 544-46 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that
Rule 26(c)(6) gives courts the ability to order that depositions and answers to
interrogatories be kept sealed).
8. See id. § 2035 (stating that Rule 26(c) offers protection to parties and
witnesses during discovery).
9. Id. § 2043.
10. Id. § 2035, at 476-77; Anita Hotchkiss & Diane M. Fleming, Protecting
and EnforcingProtective Orders:EasierSaid Than Done, 71 DEF. COUNS. J.161,
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The reasons are, presumably, obvious: the number of claims
is not the only thing that is massive about mass torts. When the
subject matter of a suit is a pharmaceutical product, a medical
device, or a consumer product, the defendant has likely created, at a
minimum, hundreds of thousands, and more likely millions or even
tens of millions, of pages of documents arguably responsive to
discovery requests.]' It is no great surprise that many documents are
asserted to be under a protective order, given the broad subject
matter routinely alleged to constitute trade secrets-ranging frommanufacturing processes to privileged communications to marketing
strategies.
The advantages of protective orders should not be
overlooked. As Arthur Miller notes, "Litigants do not give up their
privacy rights simply because they have walked, voluntarily or
involuntarily, through the courthouse door." 12 Unfettered distri
bution of otherwise private materials has its own harm (even if the
information has no independent value) increased, as he again notes,
"when the information is disclosed to the media, competitors,
3
political adversaries, and even curious members of the public."'
The more obvious reason for the use of protective orders is,
of course, to protect the litigants' property rights. Again quoting
Miller:
In today's business world, commercial information
often has a value that is tangible enough to be bought
and sold for huge sums of money, and extraordinary
efforts are expended to control it and to maintain its
security and confidentiality. It is not surprising, then,
that our legal system considers information to be
14
property.

161 (2004) (discussing the potential for protective orders to exclude confidential
information). Though the Hotchkiss article is introduced with an assertion that

"[the] harsh truth is that the era of broad, agreed-upon protective orders covering
virtually every document is gone," id., such orders remain common at least in mass
tort litigation, for reasons described in the text.
11. See Weinstein, supra note 5, at 53-54 (referring to the changes wrought
in data collection by Internet and e-mail technologies).
12. Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality,Protective Orders,and PublicAccess to
the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 466 (1991).

13. Id.
14. Id. at 467-68.
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Such information can range from the classic trade secret (e.g.,
the formula for Coke 15 ) to perhaps the less obvious but stillprotected marketing plans, market share data, and the like. It can,
further, include information that may also be relevant to public
safety questions: company scientists speculating about how a
comparative safety test might end up, internal analyses of adverse
event reports, and so on. 16
Perhaps more problematically, there are other reasons for the
extensive use of protective orders in mass tort cases, and for
plaintiffs sometimes not pushing as hard for disclosure as one might
expect. As has been described by others, the possibility of keeping
documents secret-both "bad documents" and marginally
confidential but valuable documents-no doubt can affect the ability
of plaintiffs to settle cases and the amount for which cases will
settle. 17 Put more bluntly, defendants will pay more to keep bad
documents secret. As most commentators observing this practice
note, to the extent the litigation system's public nature is important
for public health purposes, the practice 8 of "buying secrecy" is, at a
minimum, worth careful consideration.'
15. Miller, indeed, discusses a labor dispute involving Coca-Cola, where,
even with a stringent protective order, the company apparently chose to settle the
case rather than disclose the formula. Id. at 469-70.
16. To emphasize, the fact that such information is potentially worthy of
protection does not mean that it is, or that I think it should be, protected in all
cases.
17. See, e.g., Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System:
PostmarketingSurveillance, Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICs 587, 665 (2005) ("Plaintiffs may accede to such
secrecy provisions in return for a higher settlement payment."); Jack B. Weinstein,
Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 469, 512 (1994)
("Plaintiffs' attorneys' threats to reveal ['smoking gun' documents] can be a
powerful lever for higher settlements."); Jack B. Weinstein & Catherine
Wimberly, Secrecy in Law and Science, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 1, 20 (2001)
("[D]efendant will agree to a settlement in a completely meritless case because the
jurisdiction is pro-plaintiff.., but the defendant may not wish to provide a basis
for national settlement before more neutral judges and juries."); Miller, supranote
12, at 473 ("In the most extreme cases, plaintiffs seek an order compelling
disclosure of commercially valuable data as a 'bludgeon' to force a favorable
settlement.").
18. See Weinstein, supra note 5, at 53 ("Any sacrifice of confidence by
shuttering off part of the sunshine through secrecy orders needs careful
consideration and justification."); Struve, supra note 17, at 665 ("Commentators
have raised concerns that secrecy provisions may prevent the disclosure to the
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That practice is obviously limited in large part to cases where
the defendant intends not to try any cases, i.e., where the parties
agree to settle or otherwise dispose of all cases outside of the
FDA of information concerning product safety."). Of course how problematic one
finds this practice depends on how one prioritizes the goals of litigation. If the
sole goal is the resolution of conflicts, this practice is largely reasonable.
However, as Struve argues, the tort system is an important part of the public health
system, and this secrecy makes unavailable potentially important sources of data.
Struve, supra note 17, at 665-66. As previously noted, this Article does not focus
on that important discussion.
It is worth observing tangentially that often the purported "smoking gun"
documents released are in fact either less compelling than represented or at most
only part of the story. In the documents released by Dr. Egilman in the Zyprexa
Injunction case, for instance, the documents can be generally categorized as
relating to potential off-label marketing of the drug and as relating to side effects,
including diabetes. The documents relating to off-label marketing are certainly of
interest, though they are largely only suggestive of an interest in such marketing
rather than evidence that Lilly in fact engaged in it. It is not generally unlawful for
a company to track off-label use (just as it is not unlawful for a doctor to prescribe
a medicine off-label); nor is it unlawful to hope for such use. Indeed, certain
actions that may encourage off-label use are permitted. And, of course, the offlabel marketing documents are, in most cases, not directly relevant to most of the
personal injury suits, though they are of tremendous interest to state and thirdparty payor litigants.
The documents relating to the safety of the medicine are facially more
concerning, but in those documents, again, there is less than meets the eye. A
majority of the documents relate to analyses of spontaneous adverse event
reports-reports that are made voluntarily by anyone who wishes to make them.
Companies are encouraged to track and analyze the reports carefully, but
epidemiologists warn against relying on them to establish rates, especially
comparative rates, of side effects, due to many confounders in the evidence. I
address the actual materiality of the leaked documents in more detail infra.
An additional factor is the difficulty of using this strategy, either by plaintiffs
or defendants. Once a matter comes to open court, of course, there is a strong
presumption of public access. See Miller, supra note 12, at 429 (discussing the
historical roots of the right of access and the modem movement towards public
access of information). In modem mass torts, at least one case almost always goes
to trial, and thus at least some key documents become public. That said, in the
primary case discussed below, the Zyprexa litigation, there has not yet been a trial,
and in cases where there are trials, the leak of documents can have its own
pernicious effects as discussed in the text.
Finally, a pragmatic note: some practicing mass tort lawyers who have
reviewed this Article suggest that once a case actually gets to trial, plaintiffs'
lawyers are not really focusing on getting the bad documents into the public
domain. That is, of course, true, and some number of documents will not in fact be
introduced into evidence in any given trial. But enough will to make it worth
something to avoid a trial and their release.
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courtroom. This is because at least some number of the critical
documents will become public at any trial that takes place, and so it
makes little sense to pay a premium to avoid the release of
documents that will become public anyway. But leverage for greater
settlements is not the only potential way that the abuse of protective
orders can be used to create undue pressure. Selective leaking of
documents to the media can create additional pressure (particularly
for publicly-traded companies) to settle cases rather than face the
possibility of a trial. In one case, the lawyer trying the first of many
cases acknowledged that he was doing just that: "'I was feeding a lot
of information to European and U.S. papers,' [Mikal Watts] says. 'It
was part of my strategy to affect the stock price, which I was very
successful at."' 19
Many judges, lawyers, and scholars have addressed the
potential advantages and drawbacks to secrecy in litigation. In what
19. Monica Langley, Courtroom Triage: Bayer, Pressedto Settle a Flood of
Suits Over Drug, Fights Back, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2004, at A I. The main
coverage I am aware of was in the New York Times, with an article coauthored by
Alex Berenson, who became a central player (and, according to Judge Weinstein, a
conspirator) in the Zyprexa Injunction case discussed below. Melody Petersen &
Alex Berenson, PapersIndicate That Bayer Knew Of Dangers of Its Cholesterol
Drug,N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 22, 2003, at A5. That story cites documents made public
by plaintiffs' attorneys but does not make clear whether they were still under the
protective order. Id. Many of them, given the timeline, had perhaps been used in
open court in summary judgment briefing. Thus, it is not certain whether they
were in fact leaked or simply released-but the strategy reflected is the same in
any event, with documents being used outside of a situation where they can be
contextualized. As noted supra, I represented Bayer in the Baycol litigation.
In one sense, the Zyprexa Injunction case is atypical. The documents were
leaked even though the defendant is settling (at least to date) every case, and thus,
one could assume, paying a premium for ongoing secrecy. That would suggest
that the plaintiffs do not, in fact, have an incentive to leak the documents, and
indeed should oppose such leaks-and in fact, as noted below, the MDL steering
committee joined in the defendants' efforts to retrieve the documents. (It is
possible, however, that the enormous press given to the leaked documents could
create new potential clients, thus benefiting the plaintiffs' counsel.)
In addition to the examples provided in the text of people interested in sealing
or revealing documents in litigation, other players include business competitors;
other plaintiffs' attorneys seeking to enter the litigation; already-involved
plaintiffs' attorneys seeking additional clients through receiving press; third-party
litigants (i.e., shareholders, attorneys general, third-party payors, and the like);
non-profit entities like Mr. Gottstein's; regulators; researchers; judges; academics;
and so on. I thank Judge Weinstein for suggesting these additional members of the
typology of interested parties.
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is a useful summary of most of the arguments before and since,
Arthur Miller wrote, in 1991, of attacks on protective orders that
arose subsequent to various court challenges to the orders, in
particular Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart.20 Miller wrote that the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America (now the American
Association for Justice ("AAJ")) was then "press[ing] for legislation
prohibiting courts from entering orders that would have the effect of
'concealing public hazards' and had "sought a presumptive right of
access to all information produced in litigation, including everything
exchanged in discovery but2 not used at trial, as well as the contents
of settlement agreements." '
Miller evaluated the benefits of major changes in protective
order practice (efficiency, public health) along with the downsides
(complicating discovery, increased demands on judicial resources). 22
Finding the alleged harms caused by secrecy to be largely overstated
and the benefits of the system as it stood to be significant, he
ultimately concluded that major changes were not appropriate in
1991, and indeed major
changes have not taken place in the ensuing
23
years.
sixteen-plus
Others have addressed the same questions and come out in a
variety of ways. Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr., Chief Judge of the
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, made
his views clear in the title of a symposium essay, "Hidden from the
Public by Order of the Court: The Case Against GovernmentEnforced Secrecy.",24 His essay focuses largely on the related but
different question of sealed settlements and closed courtrooms (as
did the symposium in which it was published), but it also addresses
20. Miller, supra note 12; Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33
(1984).
21. Miller, supranote 12, at 442.
22. Id. at 477-89.
23. Id. at 502. Laurie Dor&in 1999 provided another extensive and thorough
exploration of the competing interests in stipulated protective orders. Laurie
Kratky Dor6, Secrecy By Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentialityin the
Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 324-71 (1999). She
concluded that stipulated protective orders "serve valuable public, as well as
private, interests." Id. at 370. She notes, however, that courts should remain
cognizant of their duty to supervise discovery and that "[i]n some instances,
broader public interests may well override the litigants' mutual desire for secrecy."
Id. at 371.
24. Joseph F. Anderson Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court:
The CaseAgainst Government-EnforcedSecrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711 (2004).
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secrecy in connection with discovery materials-though only in the
context of the materials being used in the action, either in connection
with trial or a motion. 25 As he points out, significant changes have
taken place in the form of "sunshine provisions"-provisions that
create (in typical examples) a presumption of access to court
records. 26 But those provisions do not, with few, if any exceptions,
change the practice in connection with protective orders-because
(in federal court and some state courts) discovery materials are not
court records.
Of particular interest (not least because he is the judge
overseeing the Zyprexa multi-district litigation discussed below) are
the views of Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of New
York. As early as 1994, Judge Weinstein wrote of secrecy
agreements

in

his seminal

Individual Justice in Mass Tort

Litigation.27 He succinctly summarized the interests involved:
The most common form of secrecy utilized by the
defendant in a mass tort case is the protective order.
[Rule 26(c)] permits... a protective order ... upon a

showing of "good cause." This provision does not
specifically refer to the public interest. Rather, it
applies primarily to commercially sensitive in
formation that might cause the defendant some
competitive harm. Defendants want to avoid dis
closure of damaging information. Plaintiffs desire to
use this damaging information as a negotiation tool
for larger settlements for clients in the future.
"Smoking gun" documents are the most
damaging form of this information. They indicate
defendants knew of the danger but suppressed the
information.28

25. Id. at 719-20 ("Although these [stipulated protective] orders often
provide for 'blanket' confidentiality of all documents produced, no public interest
is implicated because discovery is not filed with the court until it is necessary to do
so in connection with a motion or a trial.").
26. See id. at 725-26 & n.40 (cataloging "sunshine provisions").
27. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION
(1995). A shorter version of much of the book was published in Weinstein, supra
note 17.
28. WEINSTEIN, supranote 27, at 67 (citations omitted).
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Judge Weinstein further acknowledged the point, most often
made by defendants, that these supposed "smoking guns" sometimes
are "shown to be neutral or even favorable to the defendant," but that
29
providing the necessary context is difficult and time-consuming.
After discussing the various interests, Judge Weinstein concluded:
Protective orders may have a legitimate role when
there is no public impact or when true trade secrets
are involved. But we can strike a fairer balance
between privacy interests of corporations and the
health and safety of the public. A publicly maintained
legal system ought not protect those who engage in
misconduct, conceal the cause of injury from the
victims, or render potential victims vulnerable.
Moreover, such secrecy defeats the deterrent function
of the justice system. 30
After noting the fact that judges might be too inclined to
approve secrecy agreements (due to a desire to clear calendars), he
argues for a national approach that would be less biased in favor of
granting broad protective orders. 3
Judge Weinstein returned to the issue in an essay in 2000,
noting that changes were taking place due to "the enormous increase
in data collected and available through computers, the ease of
widespread transmission via the internet and e-mail," and other
32
In discussing protective orders, he
technological phenomena.
repeated verbatim much of the description above, and noted his
it
practice of approving sealing orders only with the addition that 33
interest."
"public
the
for
necessary
if
could be judicially modified
As earlier, he argues for a balancing test, "weighing the interests of
the parties in keeping the information confidential against the
interests of the public in publishing it." 34 His default view is clearly
in favor of disclosure: "Each case is different, but, in general, where
there is a doubt, secrecy should be rejected. Any secrecy agreement
29. Id. at 68.

30. Id. at 70 (citations omitted).
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 71.
Weinstein, supranote 5, at 54.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 58.
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should have a judicial imprimatur, with the discretion in the court to
modify the agreement on application of a party to the litigation or of
' 35
a third party."

A year later, Judge Weinstein returned to the topic in an
article co-authored with his law clerk. 36 He again repeated verbatim
much of the same introductory material, but expanded his views as to
mass tort litigation in particular:
Because mass tort cases are similar in some respects
to institutional reform through legislation or private
attorney general litigation in their impact on society,
the interests of individual members of the community
must sometimes give way to the interests of the
community as a whole. Judges must consider the
need for a broad-based public inquiry in mass tort
cases, especially since government regulatory systems
designed to protect the public are often inadequate.
They must weigh the potential interests of litigants in
other lawsuits, the needs of regulatory agencies to
have access to information, the interests of future
plaintiffs, and the concerns of public interest groups,
which includes the concerns
of the scientific
37
community, for openness.
Even with this more explicit concern about secrecy in mass torts,
Judge Weinstein concludes with his same recommendation-that
judges note that protective orders can be modified when in the public
interest, along with some encouragement
for third-party intervention
38
disputes.
order
in protective
This much is not new. The document productions in mass
tort litigation have been sufficiently large to justify umbrella
protective orders for years, and some numbers of documents have
been leaked from time to time for the same period. And, of course,
scholars, lawyers, judges, and others have argued that protective
orders fail to strike the proper balance as to the public interest, and

35. Id.at 65.
36. Weinstein & Wimberly, supra note 17.

37. Id. at 21-22 (footnotes omitted).
38. Id. at 18-24.
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have urged changes in the law, but the applicable law has not
changed appreciably.
What is new is what happens after those leaks. To see how
that has changed, we turn to Zyprexa.

II.

THE ZYPREXA CASE

Zyprexa (the brand name for olanzapine) is what is known as
an atypical antipsychotic medication. It was approved in 1996 and is
marketed by Eli Lilly & Company ("Lilly"), for which it, at this
writing, represents, by a substantial margin, its most successful
product in terms of annual sales. 39 It is approved in the United
States for the treatment of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, and
agitation associated with both of those ailments.4 °
At least 30,000 personal injury lawsuits have been filed
against Lilly relating to alleged injuries claimed to be caused by
Zyprexa. 4 1 Though the allegations vary, the core claims asserted by
plaintiffs relate to obesity, weight gain, and diabetes (and insufficient
warnings thereof). 42 Plaintiffs (including third-party payors) also
allege that Lilly improperly marketed Zyprexa "off-label" (i.e., for
indications for which it is not approved) as a treatment for dementia
and related symptoms. 43 No cases have gone to trial. As of its 2006

39. ELI LILLY & Co., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, NOTICE OF 2007 ANNUAL
12 (2007) [hereinafter 2006 ANNUAL REPORT],
available athttp://www.lilly.com/investor/annual-report/lillyar2006.pdf.
40. PACKAGE INSERT FOR OLANZAPINE 4-7 (2007), available at
http://pi.lilly.com/us/zyprexa-pi.pdf
MEETING AND PROXY STATEMENT

41. In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d 385, 391 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
42. Id.
43. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1956, 05-CV-4115,
05-CV-2948, slip op. at 2-3. (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2007) (order denying summary
judgment), available at http://psychrights.org/states/Alaska/CaseXX/EilLilly/
zyprexa-order-6-28-07.pdf. Indeed, some of the state investigations and suits have
followed the New York Times stories that were based on the leaked documents
discussed infra. See Alex Berenson, Lilly Considers $1 Billion Fine to Settle
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2008, at Al (reporting on possible $1 billion
settlement with state and federal governments for violating laws governing how
drugs can be promoted); Alex Berenson, Drug Files Show Maker Promoted
Unapproved Use, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2006, at Al, (reporting, based on leaked

documents, that Lilly promoted Zyprexa as a treatment for conditions other than
The off-label marketing claims do not
bipolar disorder or schizophrenia).
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Annual Report, Lilly has instead settled the substantial majority of
the Zyprexa cases, with charges of over $1.5 billion.44 Additional
settlements have been announced since then.45
Millions of pages of documents have been F6roduced by Lilly
to the plaintiffs, in both federal and state cases.
A presumably
smaller number of pages-largely medical records-have been
produced by the plaintiffs.47 Many of those pages are stamped under
48
the Protective Order, "Confidential-Subject to Protective Order.,
Thousands of pages of documents so stamped ended up in the
hands of reporters and activists, available within minutes to anyone
who wanted to find them, in what the trial judge concluded was a
violation of the protective order. 49 Those documents remain readily
available online, as discussed below, despite the judge's conclusion
that the documents were improperly leaked and the injunction of a
number of people who had been distributing them. 50
The Zyprexa experience provides a useful example of the
modem state of play in mass torts and protective orders, and it is
therefore worth describing in detail.
A.

The ProtectiveOrder

The "Protective Order" referenced is an August 9, 2004,
order issued by Judge Weinstein, also referred to as "Case
Management Order No. 3.,,51 That Order was issued, by its terms, to
necessarily relate to the injury claims, except for plaintiffs who can allege that they
should not have received Zyprexa at all and that the product caused harm.
44. See 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 11 (reporting $1.07 billion

of pre-tax settlement in second quarter 2005 and $500 million in fourth quarter
report).
45. Alex Berenson, Lilly Settles With 18,000 Over Zyprexa, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.

7, 2007, at C1.
46. Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 392 (noting that "millions of
documents" were obtained by plaintiffs' counsel under discovery order requiring
records be sealed on consent of the parties).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 422-23.
50. See infra Part II.C.

51. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1596, 2004 WL 3520247, at
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2004) (protective order). Judge Weinstein is the judge
supervising the Multi-District Litigation; all federal cases brought relating to
Zyprexa have been transferred to him for pre-trial discovery purposes.
*1
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"expedite the flow of discovery material, facilitate the prompt
resolution of disputes over confidentiality, adequately protect
confidential material, and ensure that protection is afforded only to
material so entitled., 52 The Order provides that the producing party
can designate any document as confidential if that party "in good
faith believes [the document] is properly protected under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(7).,, 53 "Confidential" documents can
be disclosed to various people employed by involved law firms,
court officials, experts, and similar people who have signed an
"Endorsement of Protective Order," which commits the party to
maintain the documents' confidentiality under the terms of the
Protective Order and subjects the signor to the court's jurisdiction.5 4
The Order also provides that a party or intervenor can dispute the
confidentiality of documents, with the designating party required to
respond within twenty days of notification; if the parties cannot
resolve the dispute amicably, the designating party is to file a motion
for a protective order within forty-five days, or longer if so agreed by
the parties.55 Finally, and importantly for the dispute in this case, the
Protective Order provides for a procedure to follow if designated
56
The person who
documents are subpoenaed by courts or agencies.
receives the subpoena is required to notify the designating party of
the details of the subpoena; "In no event shall confidential
by the
documents be produced prior to the receipt of written notice
57
object.",
to
opportunity
reasonable
a
and
party
designating

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at *2-3.
55. Id. at *5. This provision, as discussed infra, became one basis for
claiming that previously confidential documents had become public.

56. Id. at *6.
57. Id. Mr. Gottstein has pointed out to me via an e-mail that a 2004 draft of
the Protective Order provided for a ten-day period after notice to the designating
party, after which production would be permitted. E-mail from James Gottstein to

author (May 23, 2007) (on file with author) (citing Letter from Christopher Seeger
to Magistrate Judge A. Simon Chrein at 17, In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
04-MD-1596 (E.D.N.Y Jul. 16, 2004)). This timeline was changed to require
"prompt" notice to the designating party and to preclude production until after a
"reasonable opportunity" to object. In re Zyprexa Prod. Liab. Litig., No. MDL
1596, 2004 WL 3520247, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. August 9, 2004).
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Obtainingthe Documents

In late 2006, however, while the litigation seemed to be
settling down, the New York Times published a series of articles
based on thousands of pages of documents it had received from an
Alaska lawyer, James Gottstein. 58 Gottstein was not involved in the
tort litigation; he works against alleged forced medications of
mentally ill patients in that state. The documents he obtained, as
described below, were from the production in the tort litigation and
were (for the most part) designated as confidential under the
Protective Order. In addition to the New York Times reporter (Alex
Berenson), Gottstein distributed the documents electronically to
roughly eighteen other people or organizations, some of whom
posted the documents online. 59 From those posts, many copies of
the documents were distributed by means of various technologies
that provide anonymity. Indeed, less than a month after the articles
ran in the Times, and after efforts by the court to enjoin distribution,
60
I was able to find the documents within nineteen minutes.
In this sub-Part, I lay out the means by which the documents
were obtained in some detail. The detail is necessary to explore the
range of parties who might have an interest in avoiding or defeating
a protective order in today's society, as discussed further below.
Dr. David Egilman, who is at the center of the Zyprexa
document leak, is an occupational health specialist and regular
plaintiffs' expert witness. 61 The Lanier Law Firm, a high-profile
plaintiffs' law firm, hired Egilman in August 2006 to serve as an
expert. 62 Not long after, the Lanier firm sent Egilman
the Protective
63
Endorsement.
attached
the
sign
to
Order, asking him
58. In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d 385, 392-93 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
59. The breadth of the document distribution online is discussed in more
detail in Part II.C. infra.
60. William G. Childs, ProtectiveOrdersand the Internet, TORTSPROF BLOG,

Jan. 8,
2007, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/tortsprof/2007/0 1/protective
_orde.html. I looked again in early July 2007 and found the documents within a
similar period of time. The details of the documents' distribution are discussed
infra Part II.C.

61. He has been identified in cases in which I have been involved as defense
counsel, though I have had no interactions with him and have no involvement in
the Zyprexa litigation.
62. Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 399.

63. Id.
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Egilman initially performed a number of edits to the
Endorsement, crossing out the sentence that acknowledged that his
execution of the Endorsement was a requirement to receive access to
the confidential documents and adding a statement that would permit
his release of confidential documents if "needed to protect public
health.", 64 An attorney at the Lanier firm "conveyed the seriousness"
of the Protective Order and told Egilman that the Endorsement was
required to be signed if
Egilman wished to receive access to the
65
documents.
confidential
Thereafter, on November 14, 2006, Egilman signed an
Endorsement with only one change, adding "other sworn statements"
as a basis for disclosure. 66 Egilman explained to the Lanier attorney
that he wanted to be able to cooperate with either the FDA or
Congress if subpoenaed.67 With those changes, which left the
fundamental strictures of the Protective Order in place, he then
received access to the full database of documents produced by
68
Lilly.
Just two weeks later, Egilman contacted James Gottstein, an
attorney in Alaska. 69 Gottstein is the founder of The Law Project for
Psychiatric Rights, also known as PsychRights. PsychRights is a
non-profit whose mission is "to undertake a coordinated, strategic,
legal effort seeking to end the abuses against people diagnosed with
mental illness through individual legal representation."
Gottstein
does not represent clients in products liability suits and had no prior
direct connection to the Zyprexa litigation. His organization's

64. Id. at 399.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 400.
67. Id. It is worth noting that Dr. Egilman himself has asserted the right
against self-incrimination and refused to testify as to these matters, id. at 406, and
so citations are to the testimony and affidavits of others. Similarly, Alex Berenson
of the New York Times declined Judge Weinstein's "invitation" to voluntarily
testify about his role in the production and distribution of the documents. Id. at
411-12. My interpretation of the facts of what occurred generally tracks that of
Judge Weinstein, and as a whole, the facts are not in dispute among the parties.
68. Egilman later said that he sent Mr. Gottstein all of the documents within
his possession. As discussed infra, he did not state whether he had previously had
more documents or had access to more documents.
69. Id. at 400.
70. Law Project for Psychiatric Rights, About the Law Project for Psychiatric
Rights (Mar. 1, 2008), http://psychrights.org/aboutus.htm.
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interest is instead on preventing the forced medication of patients
with what it describes as "brain damaging psychiatric drugs."7I
What happened between Egilman's execution of the
Protective Order Endorsement and his contact of Gottstein is not
completely clear, but it seems fairly certain that Egilman contacted
Times reporter Alex Berenson and suggested that Berenson would be
interested in some of the documents Egilman had received under the
Protective Order. 72 Recognizing the challenge presented by the
Protective Order, Berenson apparently suggested that Egilman
contact Gottstein, whom Berenson knew, based on prior contacts, to
be interested in psychiatric medication issues. 73 When Egilman
contacted him, Gottstein understood it was in an effort to get
assistance disseminating documents that were then subject to a
Protective Order. 74 In fact, Gottstein requested a copy of the
Protective Order, but (per Gottstein's testimony) Egilman said that
Gottstein "didn't want it" and Gottstein "didn't push it."' 75 Gottstein

testified that Egilman was in some way trying to protect Gottstein:
"My kind of sense was that if I didn't have [the Protective Order],
then I wouldn't be charged with the knowledge of it." 76 By the end
of the phone call, it was clear to Gottstein that he would attempt to
find a case in which he could subpoena the documents. 77 Further, it
was clear to Gottstein that, at least as far as Egilman was concerned,
the purpose of the subpoena was to get the documents distributed to
an array of specified
individuals, including journalists and staffers
78
from Congress.

Gottstein, as he and Egilman expected, did indeed find a case
for which he could issue a subpoena for the documents. 79 He did so,
71. Id.
72. Zyprexa Injunction,474 F. Supp. 2d at 400-01,403.

73. Id.at 400.
74. In Gottstein's letter to the special master in December of 2006, he wrote
that, in the course of the phone call with Egilman, he "learned that [Egilman] had
access to secret Eli Lilly documents pertaining to Zyprexa," suggesting that the
phone call was not directed to the document production from the start. Letter from
James Gottstein to Special Master Peter H. Woodin (Dec. 17, 2006) (on file with
author). The apparent inconsistency is not particularly important for these
purposes.
75. Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 401.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 400-01.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 401-02.
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issuing a subpoena duces tecum dated December 6, 2006, in the case
of In re Guardianship of B.B., an Alaska Superior Court
proceeding. 8° That subpoena had a return date of December 20,
2006, and included a document request to which the documents
81
Egilman received under the Protective Order would be responsive.
Egilman faxed the subpoena to Lilly's general counsel on December
6; he did not directly notify litigation counsel (either for the plaintiffs
or the defendant). 82 On December 11, Gottstein served an amended
subpoena requesting that Egilman produce the documents "as soon
you can. ' 83 The stated reason for the amended subpoena and the
shift in the production date was that Gottstein realized that the
deposition was to be by telephone, and so that Egilman would be
84
unable to bring the documents with him to the deposition.
Importantly, Egilman did not serve this amended subpoena on Lilly
(either the General Counsel or litigation counsel), nor did he notify
the Lanier firm. 85 This was despite the fact that Gottstein
"repeatedly" told Egilman "that he should send the second subpoena
to Lilly,"' 86 and despite the fact that the Protective Order itself

80. Subpoena for Taking Deposition to David Egilman, In re Guardianship of
B.B., No. 3AN-04-545 P/G (Alaska Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 2006).

81. Id. Gottstein acknowledged that the patient "B.B." (referred to in some
transcripts as "D.B.") may not have been on Zyprexa. Transcript of Hearing
Before Hon. Jack Weinstein at 33, In re Zyprexa Litig., No. MDL 1596 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 16-17, 2007), first day available at http://psychrights.org/States/Alaska/
CaseXX/EilLilly/01-16-07Transcript.txt,
second day available at http://
psychrights.org/States/Alaska/CaseXX/EilLilly/O 1-1 6-07Transcript.txt.
Given
PsychRights's general argument that the risks of psychiatric medications are
insufficiently warned-of, and that involuntary treatment with them is inappropriate,
I assume he would argue that any evidence of undisclosed risks within the
documents would be relevant to the litigation.
82. See also Letter from David Egilman to Brewster H. Jamieson (Dec. 15,
2006) (on file with author) (indicating that he found the General Counsel's fax
number in a CLE online, but not noting any effort to ask the Lanier Law Firm for
contact information for Lilly's litigation counsel). The protective order specifies
that the notice is to go to the designating party, so notifying Lilly through its
general counsel's office is likely sufficient, even if it might evidence an intent to
do the minimum necessary.
83. Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 401.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 402.
86. Id. at 401.
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required that the producing party be informed of the date on which
production was requested. 8
Dr. Egilman began sending documents (via FTP transfer) to
Gottstein almost immediately, starting on December 12.88 The next
day, Lilly's litigation counsel contacted the Lanier law firm to
discuss the pending subpoena-which, as far as Lilly knew, had a
return date of December 20. Richard Meadow, an attorney at the
Lanier firm, then contacted Egilman. As Meadow testified in a
hearing on the matter:
Q:
You spoke to Dr. Egilman on December 13,
correct?
A:
Without looking at it, I believe so, yes.
Q:
That was the Wednesday, December 13?
A:
Yes.
Q:
And you told him not to produce documents
requested in this subpoena that had been issued from
the State of Alaska?
A:
I said don't do anything with the subpoena
until you hear from me.
Q:
And you did that because you knew there was
a process that was being followed under the protective
order and that Lilly had already started that process,
correct?
A:
I had received a phone call from [Lilly lawyer]
Andy Rogoff and I told him that I would reach out to
Dr. Egilman and tell him not to do anything.
Q:
And he said -- what did Dr. Egilman say to
you?
A:
He just said yes, Rick.
Q:
And you -- what did you understand that to
mean?
A:
That he understood that I told him don't do
anything. I don't want to read into other than what
he said to me.
87. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1596, 2004 WL 3520247, at
*6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2004).
88. Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 401-03.
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Q:
Did you later learn that Dr. Egilman had
already begun transferring documents to Mr.
Gottstein?
Yes. 89
A:
Judge Weinstein concluded that the shift in production date,
rather than merely being a necessity for the telephonic deposition,
was in fact a "subterfuge." 90 Gottstein testified that he did not
review the documents upon receipt; instead, he immediately began
burning multiple copies of the documents to DVDs, distributing
them to at least fifteen people, including both reporters and
activists. 91 As promised, the documents were delivered to the New
York Times's Alex Berenson.
The New York Times (the only print publication to which
Gottstein provided the documents) published articles by Berenson
almost immediately, with three stories run on the front page between
December 17 and December 21.92 The articles relied heavily on the
documents obtained from Egilman via Gottstein.
Contemporaneously, the documents were widely distributed
online. One of the recipients, Mind Freedom International, posted a
statement on December 29, 2006, noting the dispute that had taken
place in the meantime and also linking to a site providing
information about the 94"Tor" software 93 and how it could be used to
obtain the documents.
89. Transcript of Hearing Before Hon. Jack Weinstein, supra note 81, at 199
200.
90. Zyprexa Injunction,474 F. Supp. 2d at 401,402-03.
91. Id. at 402.
92. Id. at 405; see also Alex Berenson, Eli Lilly Said to Play Down Risk of
Top Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2006, at Al; Alex Berenson, Drug Files Show
Maker Promoted Unapproved Use, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2006, at Al; Alex
Berenson, DisparityEmerges in Lilly Data on Schizophrenia Drug, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 2006, at Cl.
93. See discussion infra Part II.D.
94. Posting of mindfreedom-news@intemex.net to news:misc.activism.
progressive (Dec. 31, 2006, 02:32:53 CST), news:en7sjl$5edS1@pencil.math.
missouri.edu, available at http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=en7sjl%2 4 5ed
The posting contained the following
%241%40pencil.math.missouri.edu.
"disclaimer" at its end: "In the public interest, MindFreedom is forwarding the
anonymous alerts referred to on this page and in MFI emails. MFI did not
originate these alerts, MFI does not vouch for their authenticity or accuracy, that's
all the information we have, MFI is not providing advice about the legality of

Summer 2008]

PROTECTIVE ORDERS

Evidently following up on its December 13 contact with the
Lanier firm, on December 14-two days after Egilman had already
started producing documents, but still six days prior to the original
subpoena's return date-Lilly wrote to Egilman and Gottstein,
directing both to refrain from producing documents unless directed
by the relevant state court in Alaska. 95 Egilman responded the same
day, this time noting that he had already started producing the
documents and arguing that he had complied with the Protective
Order. 96 As Judge Weinstein drily noted, "[H]e did not address the
question of why he never notified Lilly about the second subpoena
with its revised production date." 97 Upon learning that the
documents had already been produced, Lilly wrote to Gottstein the
following day, asking that he return the documents, cease further
those to whom he had
distribution, request the return of them
98 from
recipients.
the
identify
and
sent them,
C.

The Documents Are Virally Distributed

By then, however, the documents were already beyond the
control of any one person or group of people. Gottstein had sent
them to enough people-and enough of those people had sent the
documents (electronically) to enough other people-that, due to
some recipients' relative technological savvy and sheer volume, the
documents simply were impossible to recover.
Some of the recipients immediately made efforts to distribute
the documents as widely as possible. Robert Whitaker, for instance,
made it quite clear that he anticipated potential challenges to the
documents' availability:

downloading the 'ZyprexaKills' files, MFI is not encouraging anyone to conduct
illegal activities regarding these files, and MFI itself is not providing the
'ZyprexaKills' files for download." Id.
95. Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 402.
96. Not long after receipt of this letter, the Lanier firm directed him to return
all Zyprexa documents and terminated him from the Zyprexa litigation. Id. at 403.
I have been told, but cannot confirm, that he has been fired from other work for the
Lanier firm.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 403. The other efforts to retrieve the documents are discussed infra
Part II.E.
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I would consider building a website that would, ahem,
make all the documents available. What could they
do to me? And how could they know how the
documents got to me? There are several channels
apparently that could be the source. You should
proceed now in whatever way makes it easiest for
you, and let others worry about
getting this
99
public.
it
making
or
out
information
Over the following couple of weeks, several grou0s
associated with some recipients distributed the documents widely.
One organization called MindFreedom (whose board member Judi
Chamberlain was a recipient of the documents) made extensive email and web communications informing supporters of where the
documents could be downloaded. The group's executive director
sent an e-mail to the organization's listserv of several thousand
people on Christmas day, linking to a website with the documents
and noting that the anonymous people distributing the documents
(the distribution he was linking to) were "counting on the fact that
many courts are closed today."' 01 On December 30, a press release
noted the injunction but also directed readers to sites "not sponsored
by MindFreedom" where the documents could be downloaded,
including both Tor sites and a free document transfer site, file
02
upload.com. 1
Another recipient (and recipient of the TRO), Vera Sharav,
posted the injunction on the website of the organization "Alliance for
Human Research Protection," along with the following notation:
"See the court injunction several of us received ... but the internet is

an uncontrolled information highway. You never know where and
when the court's suppressed documents might surface."' 0 3 The

99. Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 407.

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Info on "ZyprexaKills" Campaign-Portal (Dec. 30, 2006),
http://www.mindfreedom.org/know/psych-drug-corp/eli-lilly-secrets/zyprexakills,
reprinted in Proposed Findings of Fact by Eli Lilly & Co. app. at 195-96, In re
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1596 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2007), availableat
http://psychrights.org/states/alaska/casexx/EilLilly/Exxhibits2LillyProposedFindin
gsofFact.pdf. These transfer technologies are described infra.
103. Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 407-08.
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posting concluded with links to two websites that,
at the time,
04
evidently had the documents available for download. 1
In other words, whether or not the recipients were explicitly
told at any point that the documents they received were likely to be
the subject of further litigation, they knew that widespread and rapid
distribution was, for their purposes, desirable.' 0 5 And they used the
available technologies-technologies that have come into existence
in the past five to ten years-to achieve those goals.
By December 23, 2006, ten days after Egilman started to
transfer the documents to Gottstein, the documents had been
distributed via "Tor."' 0 6 They also promptly became available via
the file sharing system known as BitTorrent.10 7 As of this writing, a
Google search for the term "zyprexakills.tar.gz" (the most common
name for the file archive) results in 435 results. 08 Most likely some
number of those results point to common sources, but the results
nonetheless indicate the breadth of the documents' distribution.
The ease and speed with which the documents were
distributed-and with which any future leaked documents will be
distributed-is critical for understanding why it is that the old model
of enforcement post-violation is no longer an option. Thus, a
summary of the various technologies used is appropriate.
The first means of distribution-and the most important for
purposes of this Article, as it was the distribution that simply could
not be stopped-was via "Tor," a network developed to facilitate
anonymous Internet usage. ° 9 Created with the support of the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, among others, the network's
developers describe it as "a network of virtual tunnels that allows
104.
105.

Id.
Of course, virtually every document in the archive has imprinted on

every page "Confidential and Subject to Protective Order," making it not
particularly difficult to guess that the documents were at least potentially obtained
under questionable circumstances.
106. See Posting of Rafi to FreeCulture @ NYU, http://www.freeculturenyu.
org/2006/12/23/zyprexa-kills-campain/#comment-2512 (Dec. 23, 2006, 4:02 PM
EST) (providing a link to http://digg.com/security/ZyprexaMemosLeaked
_usingTor).
107. See Posting of bigwyrm to http://digg.com/security/ZyprexaMemos_
Leaked-usingTor?t=-4649295#c4649295 (Jan. 9, 2007) (claiming that the files
were available on BitTorrent and providing a link to http://thepiratebay.org/
tor/3589817/ZyprexaKills.tar.gz).
108. Google Search, http://www.google.com/search?q=zyprexakills.tar.gz.
109. Tor: Overview (Feb. 27, 2008), http://tor.eff.org/overview.html.en.
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people and groups to improve their privacy and security on the
Internet." 110 Most importantly for the distribution of documents
such as these, "Tor's hidden services let users publish web sites and
other services without needing to reveal the location of the site."''1
By using those services, a URL is created with the top-level domain
'.onion," rather than the common ".com .... net," '.org," or any other
top-level domain. 112 Thus, in this case, one of the ultimate recipients
of the Zyprexa documents set up a website that was reachable at
http://tdkhrvozivoez5ad.onion/. 113 The advantage to the creator of
using a "hidden site" is just that-it is hidden. Unless the operator
errs in setting it up, the location (physical, network, or other) is not
able to be determined.
The details are not terribly important, but in essence, the Tor
network passes data along through a number of cooperating servers,
each of which only knows a little bit about the origin and destination
of the data. 114 Put another way, each server only knows where the
data packet came from and where the data packet is going, but
neither the ultimate origin nor the ultimate destination. 15 Further,
each step is separately encrypted, and the path taken changes every
minute or so.
Using the same basic approach, the Tor network can provide
"hidden" websites.11 7 Unless the site's location is disclosed in some
other way, the reader cannot determine the site's origin, and the
proprietor of the site cannot identify anyone who posts onto the
site.1 18 Thus, it is impossible for a party or the court to identify the
119
proprietor of the Tor site used to host the Zyprexa documents.

110.

Id.; cf Alex Curtis, Senator Ted Stevens Speaks on Network Neutrality,

PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, June 28, 2006, http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/497.
111. Tor: Overview, supranote 109.
112. See Tor: Hidden Service Configuration Instructions (Feb. 27, 2008),
http://tor.eff.org/docs/tor-hidden-service.html.en
(describing
the
"hidden

services").
113. See Posting of fgrieczfbc to FreeCulture @ NYU, http://www.
freeculturenyu.org/2006/12/23/zyprexa-kills-campain/#comment-3353
(Jan. 1,
2007, 10:12 PM EST) (linking to http:// tdkhrvozivoez5ad.onion!).
114. Tor: Overview, supra note 109.
115. Id.
116.

Id.

117.

Id.

118.

Id.

119.

Id.
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Similarly, BitTorrent provides an alternate means of
distribution that is extremely difficult to trace and shut down.
BitTorrent "is a file-sharing program that allows users to download a
file from many other users, rather than from a central server like
Many-perhaps most--of the 435 results noted
Napster. ' 20
above 21 are references to BitTorrent indices providing access to the
document archive. The structure of BitTorrent makes it difficult to
stop data distribution not because it is particularly difficult to find
out who is using it, but because of the distributed nature of the files
being delivered. 122 The files are divided up amongst the many
computers that are part of the network and that have the relevant file,
so that someone downloading the Zyprexa documents, for example,
might be downloading the archive from a dozen different computers
around the world. 123 Each new downloader represents another
potential seed for the archive. Thus, even if someone attempting to
enforce an injunction or protective order could find eleven of the
with the endeavor
twelve, that twelfth could quickly multiply again,
124
Whac-A-Mole.
of
game
high-tech
a
into
turning
Finally, a number of anonymous file transfer sites have come
into existence since roughly 2003. With names like YouSendIt.com,
RapidShare.de, SendThisFile.com, and the like, these sites are
advertised as ways to avoid problems with limitations on e-mail
attachment sizes.' 2 5 In addition to those uses, these sites are
120. Dan Leroy, If It's Live, It's Probably Already Online, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 12, 2004, at CN14.
121. Google Search, supra note 108.
122. Paul Boutin, Caveat MPAA: Meet Bittorrent,the File-SharingNetwork
27, 2004,
Feb.
That Makes Trading Movies a Breeze, SLATE,
http://www.slate.com/id/2096316/. Indeed, the creator of BitTorrent has "refused
to add privacy protections that could keep users from being traced by, say,
Hollywood lawyers." Id. That said, various services purport to block one's
Paul Gil,
identity while using peer-to-peer software such as BitTorrent.
Anonymous Surfing: How to Conceal Your Digital Identity While Online (Apr.
17, 2007), http://netforbeginners.about.com/od/internetl0l/f/anonymoussurf.htm.
In fact, Tor could theoretically be used in conjunction with BitTorrent, but the
download speeds are reportedly slowed dramatically, since it is not designed for
such use. See generally Digg - Bittorrent Masking: How to Avoid Getting Tracked
as you Download, http://www.digg.com/software/BittorrentMasking:_How-to_
AvoidGettingTracked asYouDownload.
123. Boutin, supra note 122.
124. WHACAMOLE.COM, http://whacamole.com/.
125. For instance, Comcast prohibits attachments greater than 10 MB on its
outgoing mail server. Help - Faq - Comcast.net, http://www.comcast.net/help/faq/
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frequently used for (legal or illegal) distribution of music and video
files, and, in this case, for the rapid and relatively anonymous
distribution of large numbers of documents.' 26 Though many of
these sites nominally require registration for some services, others do
not, and those that do can often be evaded through the use of a
"disposable e-mail address" provided by various services like
Mailinator.com.
Since the leak described herein, a new website
WikiLeaks.org-has been formed with the stated purpose of
"developing an uncensorable system for untraceable mass document
leaking and public analysis."12 7 More specifically, the planned site
"combines the protection and anonymity of cutting-edge
cryptographic technologies with the transparency and simplicity of a
wiki interface."' 128 What precisely it will include is unclear, and it
appears to focus primarily on government documents from outside of
the United States, but it is, at the least, indicative that the use of the
Internet for widespread distribution is growing and will continue to
do so.
Together, these technologies make the widespread
distribution of tens of thousands of pages a trivial matter, with
virtually no financial cost besides Internet access. Put another way,
today's Internet makes any leak an immediate and irreversible
deluge. And that is precisely
what happened in this case, as
29
1
below.
and
above
described
index.jsp?faq=Email 117627. These services still have size limitations, but files
are fairly easily split up into smaller sections. See, e.g., Frequently Asked
Questions I YouSendit, http://www.yousendit.com/cms/faq (limiting transfers to 2
GB for paid accounts and 100 MB for "lite" accounts); RapidShare Webhosting +
Webspace, http://rapidshare.de/ (allowing up to 300 MB per file).
126. As of this writing, there appear to be few if any instances of the
documents on those file services. The uploads (especially with free accounts)
typically expire within a week or so. When, on January 8, 2007, I wrote that
"[o]nce I thought of the better approach (which on better days I would have tried
first)" it took less than thirty seconds to find the documents, I was referring to
performing a Google search for zyprexakills.tar.gz. Childs, supra note 60. At that
time, my recollection is that there were at least five easily-found links to the
document archive on sites like YouSendlt.com.
127. Wikileaks, http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks.
128. Wikileaks:About, http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:About.
129. The details are not critical, but, as noted above, the documents have
persistently been available--easily-through one or more of the technologies
described above.
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The Retrieval Efforts

Throughout the time period of late December of 2006 and
January of 2007, the litigants (including the plaintiffs' attorneys in
the tort litigation) and the court were making significant efforts to
retrieve the documents 13 0 -efforts which were, as described above,
largely futile.
On December 15 (three days after Egilman had started
sending documents to Gottstein, and two days after Gottstein started
distributing documents to over a dozen people), the discovery special
master, Peter Woodin, learned of the documents' delivery to
Gottstein. 131 He issued an order requested jointly by the plaintiffs
and defendant; that order directed Gottstein and Egilman to deliver
all Zyprexa documents (including copies delivered to others) to
Woodin's office. 132 Gottstein responded by e-mail, challenging the
special master's authority, the court's jurisdiction, and the ex parte
nature of the order, but also stating that he had ceased distribution of
the documents. 133 He did not report any effort to comply with the
the documents from
rest of the order-i.e., attempting to retrieve
34
1
them.
delivered
had
he
others to whom
Three days later, Lilly and the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee
jointly requested an injunction requiring the documents' return. The
initial request was to the magistrate judge, who was clearly unhappy,
describing the events as "disturbing" and as having the "ring of
collusion." 1 35 He continued:
I think that what happened here was an intentional
I per
violation of Judge Weinstein's orders ....
sonally am not in a position to order you [Gottstein]

130.

See discussion infra.

131.

In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d 385, 404-05 (E.D.N.Y.

2007).
132.
133.

Id.
E-mail from James Gottstein to Special Master Peter H. Woodin (Dec.

17, 2006), available at http://psychrights.org/States/Alaska/CaseXX/EilLilly/e

mail2Woodin 12-16-06.pdf.
134. Id.
135. Transcript of Telephone Conference Before Hon. Robert Mann at 9, In
re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1596 (JBW) (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2006),
http://psychrights.org/States/Alaska/CaseXX/EilLilly/ 12-18
at
available
06HearingNo 1Transcript.pdf.
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to return the document. I can't make you return them,
but I can make you wish you had because I think this
is highly improper not only to have obtained the
documents on short notice without Lilly being
advised of the amendment but then to disseminate
them publicly before it36could be litigated. It certainly
smacks [of] bad faith. 1

The same day, the parties jointly approached the emergency
judge, Judge Cogan. 137 After hearing from Lilly, the Plaintiffs'
Steering Committee, and, through counsel, Gottstein, Judge Cogan
issued a temporary restraining order, finding that Gottstein
"deliberately and knowingly aided and abetted Dr. David Egilman's
breach of' the protective order.138 Gottstein was enjoined from any
further distribution and ordered to return all documents (including
copies) and to identify all of the people to whom he distributed the
documents. 139 Gottstein subsequently contacted all of the people to
whom he had transmitted the documents; many of them returned the
documents, while others did not. 140 He certified compliance with the
order by letter on December 21.141 But of course, he was not
required to actually retrieve documents from others, but only to
request their return.
On December 29, the parties to the MDL jointly requested a
preliminary injunction reaching those people who had not complied
with Gottstein's request to return the documents. 142 That injunction
was issued the same day by Judge Cogan, barring twelve individuals
from disseminating the documents, requiring the documents'
removal from any website to which they had posted them, and
requiring that those individuals inform any further recipients of the
terms of the preliminary injunction. 143 At a January 3, 2007 hearing
before Judge Weinstein, the parties who were present agreed to the
136. Id. at 10; Zyprexa Injunction,474 F. Supp. 2d at 405.
137. Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 405-06, 428.
138. Id. at 405-06 (quoting In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL
1596, 2006 WL 3877528, at *1 (E.D.N.Y Dec. 19, 2006) (order granting
mandatory injunction)).
139. The TRO also required that he preserve all relevant communications.
140. Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 406.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 407-08.
143. Id. at 407.
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preliminary injunction's extension to January 16, when an
evidentiary hearing was scheduled.1 44 A day later, Judge Weinstein
agreed to expand the enjoined parties to include two additional
groups, five websites, and an individual, all of whom were
distributing the documents. 14 5 And a two-day evidentiary hearing
began on January 16, 2007, with representation present for most of
the enjoined parties and websites, in addition to representation by the
Electronic Freedom Foundation for an anonymous person who
wished to post the documents online. 14 6 On the 16th, Judge
Weinstein also extended the preliminary injunction until such time as
he considered a permanent injunction. 147 Four witnesses testified:
Gottstein himself, Richard Meadow 48(an attorney with the Lanier
firm), Vera Sharav, and David Oaks. 1
Judge Weinstein issued that injunction on February 13,
The injunction was, as noted above, almost entirely
2007.149
ineffectual in actually limiting access to the documents.15 0 Today (a
year later as of this writing), the documents are readily available, still
emblazoned with "Eli Lilly-Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation"
and "Confidential and Subject to Protective Order" at the bottom of
every page. Also as of this writing, no contempt motions have been
brought against any of the people involved, though filings suggest
that a settlement of issues relating to the document distribution may
be forthcoming. 151

144.
145.

Id. at 408.
Id.

146. Transcript of Hearing Before Hon. Jack Weinstein, supra note 81, at 1
3. Alex Berenson of the New York Times was not represented; he was also not
subject to the injunction. On January 29, Judge Weinstein issued an "invitation" to
Berenson "to confront testimony received [at the hearing] implicating him in a
conspiracy to obtain and publish confidential documents sealed by this court."
Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 408. Through counsel, Berenson declined.
Id. at 411.
147. Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 408.
148. As noted above, Sharav and Oaks are both associated with recipients of
the documents.
149. Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d 385.
150. Zeller, supra note 2.
151. Motion for Extension of Deadlines, In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig.,
Nos. 07-1107-cv, 07-1030-cv (2d Cir. May 29, 2007), available at
http://psychrights.org/States/Alaska/CaseXX/EilLilly/InjunctionAppeal/90
dayExtensionMotion.pdf.
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In early September 2007, Lilly and Egilman settled any

potential contempt charges. Egilman agreed to pay $100,000 (to be
donated to a mental health charity selected by Lilly), acknowledged
violation of the protective order, 152 acknowledged that Lilly had a
story that he did not seek to tell through his document release, and
He
acknowledged that his targeted leak helped plaintiffs. 53
additionally expressed "regret" for his actions. 154
Potential contempt charges against Gottstein and others
apparently remain possible. As of October 2007, Gottstein reported
that he was hopeful that settlement talks would be successful, and his
55
appeal has been suspended during their pendency. 1

152. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 07-CV-00504, slip op. at 1-2
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007) (stipulated order).
153. See Declaration of David Egilman, In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 1:07-CV-00504-JBW-RLM (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007), available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/tortsprof/files/EgilmanAffidavit.pdf.
A bit
oddly, Egilman and his counsel argued that Egilman did not acknowledge doing
anything illegal, evidently concluding that "illegal" would only include clearly
criminal conduct. Ed Silverman, Lilly Settles with Zyprexa Document Leaker,
PHARMALOT, Sept. 7, 2007, availableat http://www.pharmalot.com/2007/09/lilly
settles-with-zyprexa-document-leaker/; Avery Johnson, Lilly and Leaker Settle,
but Arguments Drag On, WALL ST. J. HEALTH BLOG, Sept. 7, 2007,
http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2007/09/07/lilly-and-leaker-settle-but-arguments-drag
on/. While parsing the affidavit is not central to this Article, I think that the
admission of a violation of a federal judge's order, see Declaration of David
Egilman, supra ("I violated Case Management Order No. 3 ('CMO-3'), which is in
force in the Zyprexa MDL."), can reasonably be called the admission of illegal
activity.
Additionally, though Egilman's affidavit explicitly states that he "released
documents that did not represent the entire set of information concerning Lilly's
action and knowledge," he disputed any characterization of what he did as "cherry
picking." He stated that he released all of the documents that he had (though he
does not state whether he previously had other documents or could have accessed
more), and thus says that he was not cherry-picking. Declaration of David
Egilman, supra. Whether only obtaining "bad documents" constitutes misconduct
on the part of a scientist or an expert witness is beyond the scope of this Article,
but it's an interesting question.
154. Declaration of David Egilman, supra note 153.
155. Mr. Gottstein told me this in an October 2007 interview on a radio
show I do, Swimming with Sharks, on WXOJ-LP in Northampton, Massachusetts.
Unfortunately, the recording of the show did not work.
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The Documents' Contents

The full range of the leaked documents is not particularly
important for present purposes, but several observations are relevant.
First, as alluded to earlier, the importance of many of the documents
is readily overstated. As just one example, a number of the
documents contain summaries of analyses of spontaneous adverse
event reports. Such reports come from voluntary reporting by health
care providers and others and, according to most epidemiologists and
1 56
regulatory agencies, can be used only for signal generation.
While it is entirely appropriate to perform and consider such
analyses, the coverage (both in traditional news outlets and online
sources) confirms that the analyses are easily over-read.1 5 7 That is
not to say that the information in them is irrelevant to the product's
safety-only that
many of them lack context to provide a full
58

understanding.

156. Statement of Janet Woodcock before Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources (May 17, 2006), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ola/2006/mifepristoneO517.html.
157. The analyses also contain a number of clearly confidential items,
including sales figures, comparative sales figures (which are typically obtained
from third-party vendors under non-disclosure agreements), and the like, which
helps to explain why they can properly be designated as confidential.
As noted infra note 180, research suggests that people generally have
difficulty accurately discerning the tone of e-mails, due presumably to the offhand
way in which they are authored. Though it seems less so in the Zyprexa litigation,
my experience suggests that many of the "bad documents" used by plaintiffs in
products litigation are created in a similar fashion--casual e-mails among
colleagues, often using shorthand that, read years later, creates a different
impression than intended. Certainly such e-mails have some evidentiary force
regardless, but those documents demand context even more than usual, I suggest.
158. While it is difficult to quantify-and most efforts to do so have been
done by people with a financial interest in the outcome-there is also the danger
that publicity about potential (but uncertain) dangers of a medicine will cause
patients to take themselves off of the medicine. New Survey Shows Product
Liability Litigation May Jeopardize Treatment Optionsfor People with Severe
Mental Illnesses, MEDICAL NEWS TODAY, June 14, 2007, http://www.
medicalnewstoday.com/articles/74116.php; see Press Release, National Council
for Community Behavioral Healthcare, Barriers to Treatment Survey Findings,
http://nccbh.browsermedia.com/cs/barriers to-treatment_survey-findings
(indi
cating that plaintiffs' lawyers' advertising can reduce compliance with
prescriptions).
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Second, the documents include some designated as
"confidential" that are not, at least on their face, confidential. 159 For
instance, a 1996 warning letter from the FDA's marketing regulatory
arm is designated as confidential, 60 though these documents are (at
least now) routinely placed on the FDA's website.1 61 A brief review
of the documents indicates that few fit into this category, but then
again, that is consistent with what Dr. Egilman's evident intent was.
Given the massive volume of documents produced, some improper
designations are no doubt inevitable, but some designations (at least
in some cases) are likely made due more to a fear of exposure than a
firm belief in the documents' confidentiality.
F.

OtherExamples ofProtective Order Violations

The Zyprexa document leak is perhaps the best example of
the modem implications of a document leak under a protective order.
But it is far from the only example.
While not an example from a mass tort, a high-profile
document leak in Mississippi and Alabama has led to civil and
criminal charges against prominent plaintiffs' lawyer Dickie Scruggs
in litigation relating to Hurricane Katrina and insurance coverage. 62
In brief, two sisters worked for a company that provided services to
State Farm, helping provide claims adjustment services in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.1 63 The sisters believed that they
witnessed fraud on the part of State Farm and began to photocopy
159. This might be in part due to the fact that the protective order allows
parties to unilaterally designate documents as confidential, only requiring a good
faith belief in the propriety of the decision. In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp.
2d 385, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
160. Letter from Kenneth R. Feather, Food & Drug Admin., to Charles R.
Perry, Jr., Eli Lilly & Co. (Nov. 14, 1996) (on file with author).
161. Warning Letters and Notice of Violation Letters to Pharmaceutical
Companies (Mar. 4, 2008), http://www.fda.gov/cder/warn/. The FDA web page

only goes back to 1997, and some letters on the page are redacted to remove
confidential information. The Zyprexa warning letter may well contain some
confidential information, but redaction likely could have readily resolved the issue.
162. See E.A. Renfroe & Co. v. Moran, No. 3:07-MC-036-SAA, 2007 WL
4276906, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 3, 2007) (discussing procedural history where

plaintiff moved that court find Scruggs in contempt for violating preliminary
injunction on discovery documents).
163. E.A. Renfroe & Co. v. Moran, 508 F. Supp. 2d 986, 988 (N.D. Ala.
2007).
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documents that they believed to constitute evidence of improper
conduct by State Farm. 164 They then (in early 2006) hired Scruggs
to represent them as whistleblowers and then to defend them against
lawsuits b-r State Farm alleging breach of their employment
Not long afterwards, they became paid "consultants"
agreement.
to Scruggs's team of Mississippi lawyers involved in insurance
coverage litigation relating to Katrina.16 In December 2006, U.S.
District Judge William Acker ordered that the putative
whistleblowing sisters and their attorneys return the documents to
State Farm, but Scruggs sent a set to Mississippi Attorney General
Jim Hood. 167 Judge Acker concluded that "Scruggs willfully
violated the court's December 8, 2006 preliminary injunction, and
that referral to a prosecutor is the appropriate course to take to
vindicate the court's authority."' 68 The Department of Justice
declined to prosecute Scruggs. 169 Judge Acker then appointed two
private attorneys as special prosecutors, 170 and, as of this writing, the
case is in pre-trial proceedings. 17 1 The leaked documents (and the
sisters' allegations relating to their experiences working for the
adjuster) have been used both to attempt to recruit new clients and as
a way to push for settlement. 172
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 988-89.
167. Id. at 989-91.
168. Id. at 995.
169. E.A. Renfroe & Co. v. Moran, Civil Action No. 06-AR-1752-S, 2007
WL 2212678, at *1 (N.D. Ala. July 26, 2007) (order appointing special
prosecutors).
170. Id.
171. Peter Lattman, The Latest in the Contempt Case Against Dickie
Scruggs, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG, Oct. 17, 2007, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/

2007/10/17/the-latest-in-the-contempt-case-against-dickie-scruggs/; United States
v. Scruggs, No. CR-07-CO-03-25-s (N.D. Ala. Aug. 21, 2007) (allegations of
criminal contempt of court).
172. In a television advertisement for the Scruggs Katrina Group, one of the
sisters, Kerri Rigsby, discusses why viewers should not accept any offers from
insurance companies: "It's rigged against you. How do I know? I'm Kerri Rigsby
and I used to work for State Farm. I know firsthand how far they will go to avoid
paying your claim. Take it from me, you need a lawyer not the Insurance
Commissioner's mediation program." YouTube - Lawyer's TV Ad Takes On Big
Insurance (May 25, 2007), http://youtube.com/watch ?v=7YSnfAfn6DA.
During the pendency of the potential contempt charges, one member of the
Scruggs Katrina Group offered to return some portion of the stolen documents "as
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Other examples are largely not as well documented as either
the Zyprexa or the Scruggs cases. By way of example, there were at
least allegations of improper distribution of confidential or privileged
documents in tobacco litigation, 173 tire litigation, 174 the litigation
relating to the statin Baycol (as described above), 75 and litigation
relating to bone screws. 176 Strikingly, David Egilman himself77was
found to have violated a prior gag order in beryllium litigation.'
part of a settlement offer." E.A. Renfroe & Co. v. Moran, Civil Action No. 06-AR
1752-S, slip op. at 9 (N.D. Ala. July 15, 2007) (order refusing to impose civil
contempt charges).
173. See Defendant Brown & Williamson Tabacco Corporation's Motion in
Limine to Exclude Its Privilaged and Proected Stolen Documents, Newcomb v.
R.J. Reynolds Tabacco Co., No. 88913-8 T.D. (Tenn. Cir. Court, Shelby County
Jan. 12, 1999). The litigation over the documents in that litigation is complex, to
say the least. Plaintiffs contended that the defendants waived privilege as to some,
and that others lost their privileged status under the crime fraud exception. Such a
discussion is far beyond the scope of this Article; I note it simply as an example.
Notably, Dickie Scruggs of the criminal contempt charges was also involved in the
tobacco document, purchasing the paralegal who leaked the documents a home and
a boat. Interviews: Richard Scruggs, Frontline: Inside the Tobacco Deal, http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/settlement/interviews/scruggs.html.
174. Nevil v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 294-051, 1999 WL 1338625 (S.D.
Ga. Dec. 23, 1999) (order sanctioning plaintiffs expert for disclosing confidential
information in unrelated litigation). The defendants in that case did not seek
significant sanctions, and the court did not impose significant sanctions, instead
essentially reiterating the terms of the extant protective order. Id. In another tire
case, a plaintiff's attorney was sanctioned for disclosing deposition testimony
subject to a protective order to another attorney in different litigation against the
same defendant.
McDonald v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., No.
801CV1306T27TGW, 2005 WL 3372855 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 12, 2005) (awarding the
defendant attorney's fees for enforcing the protective order), affirmed, 186 F.
App'x 930 (1 lth Cir. 2006).
175. See discussion supra note 19. As noted there, I was involved in the
defense of the Baycol litigation and remain a consultant to the company.
176. See Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Orthopedics for the FDA's Forked
Tongue, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1997, at A17.
177. Pamela A. MacLean, Law Firms Not Liable in Alleged Web Hacking
Case, NAT'L L. J., Dec. 9, 2005, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?
id=1134036310706. In that case, the court ordered that participants not make
extrajudicial statements; Egilman was found to have violated that order by posting
statements on his password-protected website. The defendants obtained access to
his statements by using a user name and password provided by a third-party. The
trial court sanctioned Egilman; on appeal, he won reversal of the part of the
sanctions that prohibited him from testifying in that courtroom in the future.
Egilman v. Dist. Court (Plaut),No. 01CA1982, slip op. at 5 (Colo. Ct. App. Sept.
5, 2002), available at http://egilman.com/Documents/JonesDay%20illegal
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WHAT-IF ANYTHING-SHOULD CHANGE?

Most serious and fundamental consideration of protective
orders in mass litigation took place a decade or more ago.' 78 Even
scholarship that is more recent builds largely on that earlier
scholarship, without serious consideration of changes in circum
stances that may counsel in favor of policy changes. The Zyprexa
case described above provides stark examples of those changes, all
of which relate in one way or another to technological changes.
First, the sheer volume of documents has exploded.
Communications that even ten or fifteen years ago might have been
by phone or in person are frequently now made via e-mail, and those
e-mails may end up being retained for years. While precise numbers
are difficult to find, experienced mass tort lawyers confirm that the
quantity of documents produced is larger by orders of magnitude
than it was in even the early 1990s.1 79 Litigation that might have at
one point produced, say, a million pages of documents now routinely
results in tens of millions of pages. With that increase comes a
concomitant increase in expenses in review and production, and the
accompanying increased odds of errors in that process. Put briefly,
non-confidential documents are more likely to be incorrectly
designated, whether innocently or not.
Second, in the world of immediate digital distribution, once a
confidential document has been leaked to even one minimally
technologically savvy person, it is almost certain to be permanently
available. Even if the source of documents could be identified, often
they are beyond the jurisdictional reach of interested courts and, in
the unlikely event that they are retrieved, the documents are likely to
pop up again elsewhere, without the context that a trial provides (and
that judges cite in creating protective orders).
The harm caused by a lack of contextualization is
exacerbated by the nature of the documents in question. Research
%20activities/appeals-court decision.pdf. It appears that one of the defense
lawyers involved was disciplined for his part in obtaining access to the documents.
Letter from Willam R. Garrett, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, State Bar of Texas,
to David Egilman, care of Robert Greenberg (Oct. 2 2003), available at
http://egilman.com/Documents/JonesDay%20illegal%20activities/stewart-bar.pdf.
178. See supra Part I.
179. One need only look at the multitude of electronic discovery services
available today to at least infer that the electronic nature of communications has
fundamentally changed document production quantities.
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confirms what most users of electronic communications already
know: people are not as thoughtful when writing electronic
communications as they are in other contexts. 180 Thus, in addition to
the inherent harm in the distribution of confidential documents and
the extant risk of documents being distributed and reviewed in

isolation, the danger of inaccurate impressions being created is
increased when the documents in question are of this sort. Further,

the probability of inaccurate impressions being given by such
documents may increase the risk of non-innocent mis-designation of
documents.
Another potential danger of document leaks and the lack of

context is the unwarranted creation of fear among patients on any
particular medicine or users of any particular product in question.

Industry-funded studies have suggested that advertisements for
attorneys seeking clients on particular drugs may cause patients to
take themselves off the medicines. 18 1 One can at least hypothesize
that a similar cause-and-effect could take place from stories
suggesting problems with a drug.
Finally, any approach has to take into consideration public
confidence and public interest in access to relevant information. If
interested third-parties believe that material non-confidential
information impacting public health will remain unavailable, the
probability increases that they will attempt to distribute documents in
violation of protective orders.

180. See Justin Kruger et al., Egocentrism Over E-mail: Can We
Communicate as Well as We Think?, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 925
(2005); see also supra note 18 (discussing the problems with isolated documents).
Of course, a lack of context for documents is not new; the most notorious
"smoking gun" document, that of the Ford Pinto, was most thoroughly discussed
by Gary Schwartz. Gary Schwartz, The Myth of the FordPinto Case,43 RUTGERS
L. REv. 1013 (1991). I discuss the Pinto document every year in my Torts class,
and students, many years after its first coming onto the national consciousness, still
consistently know of it-and don't know the reality of it. More recently, a lowlevel employee of Wyeth wrote an offensive e-mail complaining about having to
deal with the settlements of claims for what she termed "fat people" scared of a
"silly" problem, and, by most accounts, that e-mail was at least important to
plaintiffs' very successful pursuit of the diet drug litigation. Robert D. Brown
stone, Preserveor Perish;Destroy or Drown-eDiscoveryMorphs into Electronic
Information Management, 8 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (2006). My former law firm
was involved in the diet drug litigation; I was not.
181. William Childs, Ads & PatientCare, TORTSPROF BLOG, June 14, 2007,
http://lawprofessors .typepad.com/tortsprof/2007/06/ads-patientcar.html.
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Ultimately, the umbrella protective order in concept remains
sound and has the flexibility to address all of these concerns. The
fundamental reasons supporting such orders still exist. Indeed, if
anything, such orders are even more necessary, given the utter
impracticability of judges individually reviewing the hundreds of
thousands or millions of pages in question. The question, then, is
what to do with these concerns-the implications of the growth in
document numbers and of immediate distribution.
First, Judge Weinstein's desire for consistency' 82 is still a
good idea. While protective orders today certainly have many
similarities, there would be value in more consistency, if for no other
reason than to permit interested parties to identify their scope
readily.
Second, protective orders should have specific and
transparent mechanisms for third-party involvement in confi
dentiality challenges. As described above, the parties to litigation
frequently have incentives to cooperate in maintaining documents as
secret even without justification-the plaintiffs' counsel to increase
leverage, the defendants' counsel to avoid distribution of harmful
(but non-secret) documents. Third-party involvement can serve as a
useful check on these interests, and, at least in mass tort litigation
where these umbrella protective orders are likely to take place, there
are frequently public interest organizations (or third-party payors)
who are interested in challenging confidentiality. The protective
order should be crafted to facilitate the prompt resolution of such
challenges.
Providing an outlet for legitimate challenges to
documents' confidentiality will reduce the incentive for third-parties
to make an end-run around the protective orders' obligations.
Third, the requirements relating to the production of
protected documents should be made unambiguous. In the Zyprexa
case, the leakers argued that Lilly was given sufficient notice, and
the protective order itself did not provide a bright line as to what
notice was required.18 3 While any actual litigation over the ensuing
disputes need not have specific timelines laid out, a specific and

182. WEINSTEIN, supranote 27.
183. The use of the amended subpoena, and the failure to notify Lilly of that
subpoena, properly doomed that argument. But had Egilman and Gottstein waited
for the date on the original subpoena to produce the documents, there still could
have been an open question about whether sufficient notice was given.
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reasonable number of days for challenges to subpoenas seems like an
obvious and low-cost reform.
Finally, and perhaps more importantly, violation of the
protective order needs to have significant penalties to deter future
violations.1 84 Such penalties should be applicable to all parties and
all violations. Thus, if a defendant consistently mis-designates
documents in bad faith, sanctions should be explicitly contemplated
in the protective order and ordered by the court, with a reasonable
85
opportunity for the producing party to de-designate documents.'
Similarly, when a signatory to a protective order violates it by
distributing protected documents without following the order's
terms, severe sanctions are appropriate. Because the harm from the
release cannot be effectively mitigated given the state of technology,
the courts need to make serious efforts to prevent the release in the
first place. Both scenarios (mis-designation and leaks) are made
more likely for the reasons described
above, which is why more
1 86
significant attention is needed.
184. Indeed, Dr. Egilman's settlement and payment of $100,000 may have
itself deterred another leaker.
A New Jersey journalist who covers the
pharmaceutical industry told me in an e-mail that he had heard, by way of an
intermediary, about a litigation expert who was considering leaking documents in
another mass tort litigation, but was waiting to see what happened to Egilman. As
of this writing, he has not heard anything more from that potential source. E-mail
from Edward Silverman, Journalist, New Jersey Star Ledger, to author (Sept. 10,
2007) (on file with author).
185. "Bad faith" is not a terribly precise term, but it is a term that courts use
regularly. Indeed, it is commonly already required in evaluating claims for
sanctions. See In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d 385, 425 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) (discussing order relating to Cooper Tire document disclosure). Trivialeven if frequent-mis-designations (e.g., designating newspaper articles as
confidential) should not trigger any bad faith findings. Instead, the focus should
be on those mis-designations that appear to be directed solely at avoiding public
knowledge of information that is not properly confidential. As noted in the text,
the protective order should give the designating party an opportunity to dedesignate documents prior to any sanctions proceedings taking place, and, unless
other evidence suggests intentional misconduct, de-designation should eliminate
the need for sanctions.
I am not oblivious to the costs that are incurred in the designation process, and
the risks of over-designation are likely smaller than those of under-designation.
That said, the concerns that important information might remain secret for no good
reason are legitimate. This approach-in particular given the opportunity to dedesignate documents-seems reasonable given these concerns.
186. Judge Weinstein, in correspondence, writes, "Generally I am opposed
to sanctions, which lead to collateral litigation and ill-will among those who
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In any such case, with an appropriate showing, courts should
be open to sanctioning not just the individuals in question (whether
experts or clients), but also counsel. If it is shown that an attorney
was either involved with or knowingly permitted such a violation to
occur, the attorney should be sanctioned accordingly. Clients and
experts are frequently one-time players, and their sanction (and even
their removal from the litigation) may be a price that an attorney
would consider acceptable in order to achieve a higher overall value.
Including the possibility of individual sanctions may change that
calculus. Given the fact that such conduct is facilitating the violation
of a court order, this should not be a particularly controversial
idea. 187

IV.

CONCLUSION

To return to a theme established above, various electronic
communication technologies-whether as mundane as e-mail or as
complex as the Tor network of document distribution-have
changed many of the assumptions inherent in modern protective
order practice.
These technologies have made violations of
protective orders (some innocent and some intentional) more likely,
and have made the impact of those violations impossible to contain.
In order to further the goals established by the creation of umbrella
protective orders in the first place, courts need to make certain
changes in those orders' scope. When the bell cannot be unrung, it is
far more important to prevent its improper ringing in the first place.
So doing will at once help prevent the improper release of
should be working together to reduce litigation tension, and which seldom have a
deterrent effect. The Rule 11 fiasco is illustrative." Letter from Judge Jack
Weinstein to author (Nov. 29, 2007) (on file with author). I share Judge
Weinstein's general reluctance to use sanctions frequently, but I emphasize that
my proposal focuses primarily on experts-people as to whom sanctions
(particularly if expressly contemplated within the protective order endorsement)
may well be effective.
187. It is worth noting that the evidence in the Zyprexa litigation does not
suggest that any of the attorneys involved in the products liability litigation were
aware of the efforts to avoid the protective order. Indeed, the lawyers from the
Lanier firm evidently immediately terminated the retention of Dr. Egilman and
cooperated in discovery in connection with the document leak. Transcript of
Hearing Before Hon. Jack Weinstein, supranote 81, at 200.
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confidential documents and create a clearer path to the release of
important non-confidential documents that can impact public health.

